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Abstract:
Aristotle studies syllogistic argumentation in Sophistical Refutations and Prior Analytics. In the latter
he focuses on the formal and syntactic character of arguments and treats the sullogismoi and non-
sullogismoi as argument patterns with valid or invalid instances. In the former Aristotle focuses on
semantics and rhetoric to study apparent sullogismoi as object language arguments. Interpreters
usually take Sophistical Refutations as considerably less mature than Prior Analytics. Our
interpretation holds that the two works are more of a piece than previously believed and, indeed, that
Aristotle's treatment of fallacious reasoning presupposes the results of the formal theory.
***
1. Introduction.
Aristotle defines "sullogismos" (syllogism) in Topics, Sophistical Refutations, Rhetoric, and Prior Analytics in
virtually the same way: "a sullogismos is a discourse [logos] in which, certain things having been supposed,
something different from the things supposed necessarily results".1 Interpreters of Aristotle's logic customarily take a
sullogismos to be a topic specific, object language argument or deduction and not to be a topic neutral argument
form or pattern. Interpreters also customarily believe Sophistical Refutations and Topics to be considerably less
mature than Prior Analytics, and, accordingly, they have not studied the one in relation to the other.
While Aristotle does treat a sullogismos in Sophistical Refutations as an object language phenomenon, it is evident
that he specifically treats the sullogismoi and non-sullogismoi in Prior Analytics A4-7 as topic neutral argument
forms or argument patterns whose instances are either valid or invalid arguments. In Prior Analytics Aristotle
establishes all the argument patterns whose instances are valid arguments-that is, all the sullogismoi of the three
figures-by means of metalogical deductions. And he just as surely establishes metalogically all the argument patterns
whose instances are invalid arguments-that is, all the non-sullogismoi-by means of the method of contrasted
instances. His logical investigations at Prior Analytics A4-7 are strictly formal and syntactic. In Sophistical
Refutations he defines a sullogismos just as at Prior Analytics, and he defines a refutation (elenchos) as "a
sullogismos whose conclusion is the contradiction of a given statement". But there he systematically treats actual
arguments, in particular, those than appear to be valid but are really only apparent or phainomenoi sullogismoi and
sophistical refutations or sophistikoi elenchoi. The emphasis, then, in Sophistical Refutations is on semantic and
rhetorical matters having to do with argumentation.
Modern interpreters have referred to the subject matter of Sophistical Refutations as "informal fallacies" without
regard to the formal results of Prior Analytics as both works bear on the practice of argumentation. We believe
that Aristotle's logical investigations in Sophistical Refutations, which emphasizes semantics, are better understood
in relation to his syntactic considerations in Prior Analytics, that Sophistical Refutations and Prior Analytics
(indeed, that all the treatises of the Organon) are more of a piece that previously believed. We aim to show that
Aristotle's treatment of the fallacies depending on and those not depending on language may presuppose the formal
results of Prior Analytics A4-7. In this respect, we take Aristotle more determinately to distinguish semantics and
logical syntax than have previous interpreters. Accordingly, we can better appreciate Aristotle's original
contributions to formal logic and to the study of argumentation.
 
2. Misinterpreting Aristotle's project in Prior Analytics
Three principal interpretive trends characterize studies of Aristotle's logical investigations. The deductionist
interpretation mathematically models Aristotle's logic as a natural deduction system. J. Corcoran, T. Smiley, and R.
Smith consider a sullogismos to be a deduction-a fully interpreted argumentation having a cogent chain of
reasoning in addition to premises and conclusion. The axiomaticist interpretation takes Prior Analytics to lay out
an axiomatized deductive system of syllogistic theorems. J. Lukasiewicz, I. M. Bochenski, and G. Patzig take a
sullogismos to be a single, relatively uninterpreted, logically true conditional proposition. Only the traditionalist
interpretation continues to hold that Prior Analytics is a logic manual for studying categorical arguments or
syllogisms. Proponents such as J. N. Keynes, R. M. Eaton, and W. D. Ross usually treat a sullogismos as a fully
interpreted, valid or invalid premise-conclusion argument.
Notwithstanding important differences, these interpretations hold quite similar views concerning Aristotle's methods
for establishing knowledge of invalidity. However, none of these interpretations provides an account that fits the text
of Prior Analytics. On the one hand, traditionalists usually apply six rules of the syllogism, namely, those pertaining
to quality, quantity, and distribution.2 This certainly does not resemble any practice of Aristotle. Axiomaticist and
deductionist interpreters, on the other hand, equally take Aristotle (1) to consider arguments or deductions and (2)
to use the method of counterargument. On both counts they are mistaken. First, Aristotle does not especially treat
arguments or deductions in Prior Analytics A4-7. Rather, with a view toward their corresponding argument
patterns, he expressly treats patterns of two categorical sentences or premise-pair patterns. Second, there is no
instance of Aristotle explicitly using the method of counterargument as is commonly maintained by interpreters such
as J. Lukasiewicz (1958: 70) and J. Corcoran (1974: 105, 1989: 31; cf. 1993: xxxi). Rather, he principally uses the
method of constrasted instances (W. D. Ross 1949) to invalidate premise-pair patterns and, consequently, their
four corresponding argument patterns.
Our interpretive standpoint takes Aristotle in Prior Analytics as verifying the results of his constructing a natural
deduction system. At A4-7 Aristotle exhaustively treats only and all possible combinations of three different terms in
premise-pair patterns to demonstrate (1) which pair patterns are concludent and generate a sullogismos and (2)
which pair patterns are inconcludent and do not generate a sullogismos (see G. Patzig 1968 and L. Rose 1968).
Accordingly, we hold that a sullogismos as treated in Prior Analytics A4-7 is neither a valid or invalid premise-
conclusion argument, nor a single, logically true conditional proposition, nor a deduction. Rather, as a relatively
uninterpreted object, it is an elemental argument pattern in one of three figures, consisting in a premise-set of two
categorical sentence patterns and a conclusion of a single categorical sentence pattern and having all valid argument
instances. Aristotle recognized the epistemic efficacy of such elemental patterns and formulated them in
corresponding sentences to express rules of deduction. Section three below addresses how Aristotle eliminates
argument patterns unproductive of deduction rules and, thus, how he identifies invalid arguments and fallacious
reasoning from formal considerations.
 
3.0 Some preliminary matters
3.1 Logic terminology. We use the following terminology, following J. Corcoran 1989 and 1993, to examine
Aristotle's logic.3 An argument is a two part system consisting in a set of sentences in the role of premises and a
single sentence in the role of conclusion; an argument is either valid or invalid. A sentence is either true or false. An
argumentation is a three part system consisting in a chain of reasoning in addition to premises and conclusion and is
either cogent, in which case it is a deduction, or fallacious, a non-deduction. A sentence, an argument, and an
argumentation are object language phenomena. An argument pattern is a two part system consisting in a set of
sentence patterns in the role of a premise-set and a single sentence pattern in the role of conclusion. A pattern is a
metalinguistic object distinguishable from a form and is commonly represented schematically (see below note 11 on
distinguishing "form" and "pattern"). An argument is said to fit or to be an instance of one or more argument patterns.
A given argument pattern may have all valid instances, all invalid instances, or some valid and some invalid instances.
An argument pattern is not properly valid or invalid, although logicians have used "valid" in this connection. Corcoran
(1993: xxxiv-xxxv) has helped to clarify category differences here by using the following terminology: an argument
pattern with all valid instances is panvalid, that with all invalid instances is paninvalid, and that having instances of
both is neutrovalid. We add that an elemental panvalid argument pattern is one having a simple premise-set
pattern whose epistemic value consists in its being "immediately" evident to someone that its conclusion follows
necessarily. An elemental argument pattern may be formulated in a corresponding sentence to express a rule of
deduction. In addition, we follow G. Patzig to distinguish in Aristotle's logic a concludent pattern of two protasesis
or a premise-pair pattern from an inconcludent premise-pair pattern. A concludent pattern has a necessary result,
that is, it results in a sullogismos, while an inconcludent pattern has no necessary result and cannot result in a
sullogismos.
3.2 Aristotle's focus on logical syntax in Prior Analytics. Aristotle knew that deductions about geometric objects
are topic specific and that they employ a topic neutral deduction system,4 even if that system is used implicitly by a
participant. In Prior Analytics he turned his attention not to geometric or biological objects, nor even to geometric
or biological discourses, but to the deduction apparatus used to make evident that a given categorical sentence
necessarily follows from other given categorical sentences. Aristotle had observed a number of elemental argument
patterns in various object language discourses, some of which he recognized always to result in something following
necessarily, others of which he recognized never to result in something following necessarily. He subsequently
extracted these patterns for systematic examination. In Prior Analytics Aristotle models his syllogistic logic and
presents the results of his investigations.5 In this connection, then, Prior Analytics is a scientific study of the
syllogistic deduction system, which, taken with Categories and De Interpretatione, comprises Aristotle's
treatment of the syllogistic underlying logic.
The results of our study of Prior Analytics show that there a sullogismos is not a fully interpreted object according
to an intended meaning in a given topical sub-language, and that Aristotle distinguishes logical syntax from semantics.
One way sufficient for determining whether or not a logician distinguishes logical syntax from semantics is to
ascertain whether a logician works with a notion of substitution (in contrast to a notion of "interpretation"). In a
substitution one changes the language, or the content words and phrases in a given language, while leaving their
meanings and the logical form fixed. In this light, observing Aristotle's pervasive use of schematic letters and his
practice of substitution for establishing inconcludence, we recognize him more determinately to distinguish semantics
and logical syntax and, indeed, to focus on the patterns of valid and invalid arguments at A4-7.
Aristotle's syllogistic syntax. The following practices in treating an underlying logic as a subject matter indicate
Aristotle's attention on formal considerations apart from particular subject matters. (1) Aristotle systematically treats
patterns of two protaseis or premise-pair patterns and their corresponding argument patterns and treats neither
premises nor arguments themselves. Arguments are introduced to establish that certain premise-pair patterns are
inconcludent. (2) Aristotle uses three sets of schematic letters to mark places for terms, one set for each figure
(schema). He names terms by their schematic positions-first (or major), middle, last (or minor)-and he calls the first
and last extremes (akra). Most significant, perhaps, is (3) Aristotle's treating categorical sentence patterns
schematically with a strict syntax. His common schematic representations of the four kinds of categorical sentence
are:
A belongs to every B
A belongs to no B
A belongs to some B
A does not belong to some B.
Here 'A' and 'B' are schematic letters6 marking places for the predicate and subject terms respectively. Although
Aristotle does not abbreviate each of the four logical constants with a letter as modern logicians, namely, with 'a', 'e',
'i', and 'o', he names them just as modern logicians do (A4, 26b30-33):
belongs to every (a) belongs to none (e)
belongs to some (i) does not belong to some (o).
Thus, using Aristotle's schematic letters and our abbreviations for the logical constants, we may represent the four
categorical sentence patterns schematically as 'AaB', 'AeB', 'AiB', and 'AoB'. Finally, (4) throughout A4-6 Aristotle
works with schematic letters for three terms in various premise-pair patterns according to three figures. In every
case, whatever order he presents the 'sentences' in a premise-pair pattern, that is, whether he states first the major
or the minor premise pattern, he always understands the predicate term (P) of the conclusion pattern (PxS) to be
the first term in the premise-pair pattern and the subject term (S) of the conclusion pattern to be the last term ('P'
and 'S'are schematic letters and 'x ' holds a place for one of Aristotle's four logical constants). This syntax is strict.
He always considers the conclusion of an argument to fit the sentence pattern PxS and not its converse.7 A familiar
way of schematically representing the standard syntax of the three figures follows (the 'premises' are numbered and
the 'conclusion is indicated by '?')
First figure Second figure Third figure
PxM, MxS | PxS MxP, MxS | PxS PxM, SxM | PxS
1. PxM 1. MxP 1. PxM
2. MxS 2. MxS 2. SxM
? PxS ? PxS ? PxS
Aristotle is well aware of a distinction between syntax and semantics, indeed, in a way familiar to A. Church, A.
Tarski and other modern logicians.
 
3.3 Establishing the sullogismoi. At A5-6 Aristotle uses a natural deduction system-which consists in four kinds of
categorical sentence, two pairs of contradictories and one pair of contraries, three conversion rules, four teleioi-
sullogismoi, and two kinds of proof (direct and indirect)-to show that a given second or third figure argument
pattern is, in fact, a sullogismos. In each case Aristotle demonstrates by means of a metalogical deduction that a
given premise-pair pattern generates a sullogismos with a certain conclusion. The text concerning Camestres
(27a9-14) makes this evident.8
If M belongs to every N but to no X, then neither will N belong to any X. For if M belongs to no X,
neither does X belong to any M; but M belonged to every N; therefore, X will belong to no N (for the
first figure has again been generated). And since the privative converts, neither will N belong to any X.
We can exactly express what Aristotle writes here in the familiar manner of a modern deduction.
1.MaN
2.MeX
?NeX
3.MeX 2 repetition
4.XeM 3 e-conversion
5.MaN 1 repetition
6.XeN 4, 5 Celarent
7.NeX 6 e-conversion
Every second and third figure sullogismos is determined in just this manner, whether by direct or indirect deduction.
Thus, he establishes all the panvalid elemental argument patterns or sullogismoi in this way.9 Every argument with
semantically precise terms fitting one of these patterns is valid.
 
3.4 Aristotle's notion of "following necessarily" .10 Aristotle defines "that which is necessary" in Metaphysics 5.5
as "that having no other relationship possible" (1015a34). At Metaphysics 4.5 he writes much the same: "for it is not
possible for what is necessary to be one way and another way, and so if something is of necessity, it cannot be so
and not so" (1010b28-30). Respecting a demonstration he writes that "if there is a sullogismos it is [logically]
impossible for there to be another relationship among them [i.e. three terms in two premises]" (1015b7-9). The
statements defining "necessary" in Metaphysics 4.5 and 5.5 (see also 1011b13-14; cf Posterior Analytics 6)
certainly help to inform our understanding of Aristotle's definition of a sullogismos in Prior Analytics A1 (24b18-
22): "a sullogismos is a discourse in which, certain things having been supposed, something different from the things
supposed results of necessity because these things are so" (24b18-20; emphasis added). In Prior Analytics he
summarizes his findings concerning the sullogismoi: "it is evident both that a sullogismos is generated necessarily
whenever the terms are related to one another as was stated, and that if there is a sullogismos, then it is necessary
for the terms to be so related" (A5, 28a1-3; cf. A6, 29a11-14). For there to be a sullogismos it is necessary and
sufficient that the terms be formally related as Aristotle states, albeit tersely, in a number of rules. Likewise, as we
shall see below (section 4.4), for there not to be a sullogismos it is necessary and sufficient that terms be formally
related in the other ways he systematically covers.
 
4.0 Establishing invalidity in Prior Analytics.
4.1. Modern methods for determining invalidity. Modern logicians most often use six methods to determine that
a given arbitrary argument is invalid: (1) the method of fact; (2) the method of counterargument and its variant the
method of counterinterpretation; (3) the method of deduction or the axiomatic method, sometimes called reduction;
(4) the method of truth tables; and, in relation to traditional Aristotelian logic, there are (5) the traditionalist method
of applying rules of the syllogism and (6) the methods of Venn and Euler diagrams. Aristotle no doubt was familiar
with the method of fact; otherwise, he applied none of these methods except, perhaps in some instances, a variation
of the axiomatic method. We briefly review only the methods of fact and counterargument to help establish that
Aristotle's method of contrasted instances is a different method.
The method of fact. A given argument is determined to be invalid when the premises are known to be true
sentences and the conclusion is known to be a false sentence. Knowledge that the premises are true and that the
conclusion is false is sufficient to determine that a given argument is invalid. The ontic principle underlying the
application of this method holds that no argument is valid whose premises are true and whose conclusion is false.
The following example of an obviously invalid argument illustrates this method (premises numbered, the conclusion
indicated by the '?'):
1.Every even number divides itself.(T)
2.Every odd number divides itself. (T)
? Every even number divides every odd number.(F)
The method of counterargument. A given argument is determined to be invalid when a counterargument is
exhibited for the given argument. A counterargument for a given argument is an argument having all true premises
and a false conclusion and is in the same form as the given argument. Knowing that a counterargument exists for a
given argument is sufficient for establishing knowledge that the given argument is invalid. The method of fact
underlies applying the method of counterargument. The method of counterinterpretation is a variant of this method: a
counterinterpretation is an argument in the same logical form as a given argument, but a model of the premise-set is
not a model of the conclusion. In a counterargument one changes the language but leaves its interpretation fixed; in a
counterinterpretation one leaves the language fixed but changes its meaning. The methods of counterargument and
counterinterpretation are both established on the ontic principle that two arguments in the same form11 are either
both valid or both invalid. This principle of form makes it possible to reduce the invalidity of arguments not obviously
invalid to the invalidity of obviously invalid arguments. The following example, in which the invalidity of argument A1
is to be established and argument A2 is known to be a counterargument, illustrates the method of counterargument.
A1 A2
1. If two is prime then three is prime. (T) 1. If two is odd then three is odd.(T)
2. Three is prime. (T) 2. Three is odd.(T)
? Two is prime (T) ? Two is odd.(F)
 
4.2 Aristotle's method for establishing inconcludence and invalidity. At A4-6 Aristotle uses other methods to
demonstrate which premise-pair patterns are inconcludent. Once grasping that Aristotle treats premise-pair patterns
and that a sullogismos is a panvalid elemental argument pattern, we can see the metalogical character of his
methods of invalidation. Accordingly, he demonstrates not the invalidity of arbitrary object language arguments but
(1) the inconcludence of premise-pair patterns and, consequently, (2) the paninvalidity of the four argument patterns
associated with each inconcludent pair in the standard syntax. In Aristotle's logic, panvalidity and paninvalidity are
exhaustive for argument patterns; no pattern is neutrovalid. And in the case of premise-pair patterns, being
concludent and inconcludent are likewise exhaustive.
Our first encounter in Prior Analytics with Aristotle's methods of invalidation is his treatment of the premise-pair
pattern PaM, MeS (26a2-9), which follows his treatment of PaM, MaS | PaS (Barbara) and PeM, MaS | PeS
(Celarent) in A4. He then immediately treats the premise-pair pattern PeM, MeS (26a9-13) in the same manner.
These four considerations together exhaust all possible premise-pair patterns with universal sentences in the first
figure. The passage at 26a2-9 provides Aristotle's fullest statement of his principal method of invalidation used in
A4-6. Of the 34 premise-pair patterns that do not generate a sullogismos in the three figures, only in six instances is
another method used and in two of these six instances he uses a third method.12 We here examine only his method
of contrasted instances which covers 28 premise-pair patterns. Aristotle writes:
However, if the first extreme follows [i.e. belongs to] all the middle and the middle belongs to none of
the last, there will not be a sullogismos of the extremes, for nothing necessarily results in virtue of
these things being so. (26a2-5; emphasis added)
This sentence states a set of necessary relationships of three terms in two universal premises for not generating a
sullogismos in the first figure. We take this passage to state a rule (a direct counterpart of those for the
sullogismoi13) concerning the premise-pair pattern PaM, MeS, that no sentence is a logical consequence of two
sentences fitting this pattern. Thus, Aristotle eliminates four argument patterns in the standard syntax from being
sullogismoi. He continues:
For it is possible for the first extreme to belong to all as well as to none of the last. Consequently,
neither a particular nor a universal conclusion results necessarily; and, since nothing is necessary
because of these, there will not be a sullogismos. Terms for belonging to every are animal, man, horse;
for belonging to none, animal, man, stone. (26a5-9; emphasis added)
Aristotle clearly uses neither the method of counterargument nor the method of counterinterpretation, each of which
requires finding an instance of an argument having true premises and a false conclusion in the same form as a given
argument. Rather, by substituting two sets of three terms for the schematic letters, he constructs two arguments each
of whose premises are true sentences fitting the same premise-pair pattern and whose conclusions also are true
sentences, but in the one argument it is an a sentence, in the other an e sentence. We can express what he says at
26a2-9 as follows.
Argument instance Schematic
pattern
Truth
value
Argument instance Schematic
pattern
Truth
value
1. Animal belongs to every
man.
2. Man belongs to no horse.
 PaM
MeS
T
T
1. Animal belongs to every
man.
2. Man belongs to no stone.
PaM
MeS
T
T
? Animal belongs to every
horse.
? Animal belongs to some
horse.
PaS
PiS
T
T
? Animal belongs to no stone.
? Animal does not belong to
some stone.
PeS
PoS
T
T
 For Aristotle this demonstrates that "nothing necessarily results" from sentences is this premise-pair pattern since, as
he shows, the results "could be otherwise". Thus, any sentences of three terms fitting this premise-pair pattern are
shown never to result together in a valid argument: no sullogismos of the extremes through a middle is possible. This
premise-pair pattern is thereby shown to be inconcludent. Aristotle does not explicitly treat i and o sentences as
possible results, although his implicitly doing so is suggested at 26a6-7 by his writing that "neither a particular nor a
universal conclusion results necessarily". It is evident, moreover, that he treats at one time in this way four argument
patterns in the standard syntax for each premise-pair pattern; he does not show that each of the four patterns is
paninvalid by using counterarguments in each case.
Aristotle's method of contrasted instances is easily adapted to the method of counterargument. Both methods
achieve the same results. We can apply Aristotle's two sets of three terms to the two argument patterns but switch
the terms for belonging to none to belonging to every and vice versa. Thus:
Argument instance Schematic
pattern
Truth
value
Argument instance Schematic
pattern
Truth
value
1. Animal belongs to every man.
2. Man belongs to no stone.
 PaM
MeS
T
T
1. Animal belongs to every
man.
2. Man belongs to no horse.
PaM
MeS
T
T
? Animal belongs to every
stone.
? Animal belongs to some stone.
PaS
PiS
F
F
? Animal belongs to no horse.
? Animal does not belong to
some horse.
PeS
PoS
F
F
 
In these cases the premises are all true sentences and the respective conclusions are false sentences. Here, then, are
counterarguments for the arguments provided by Aristotle, which may serve as modern counterparts to Aristotle's
ancient method. It is apparent that Aristotle does not use this method in A4-6.
It is evident, then, that Aristotle's focus in Prior Analytics A4-7 is on the formal matters of logic, in particular, on
determining which argument patterns have all valid instances and just as surely on determining which argument
patterns have all invalid instances. He makes there determinations without special reference to semantic matters, or,
that is, by assuming the semantic unambiguity of terms substituted for his schematic letters so as not to alter an
argument's logical pattern. The result of his logical investigations, then, enables him to determine the validity or
invalidity of a given 'syllogistic' argument by virtue of its form alone. He has identified all the argument patterns
whose instances, in the case of valid arguments, have conclusions which follow logically from premises. Aristotle's
accomplishment to establish the epistemic value of these formal results should not be underplayed.
 
5.0. Fallacious argumentation in Sophistical Refutations.
In Sophistical Refutations Aristotle treats sophistic and eristic argumentation. He refers to this kind of reasoning as
producing phainomenoi sullogismoi or apparent sullogismoi. These are arguments that appear to be sullogismoi
and refutations (elenchoi) but which are really instances of faulty reasoning. Aristotle has a somewhat broad notion
of a sophistical argument: "by a sophistical refutation and sullogismos I mean not only a sullogismos or refutation
which appears to be valid but is not, but also one which, though it is valid, only appears to be appropriate to the
thing in question" (SR8). Below we only treat those fallacies which appear to produce a refutation and not those
arguments that are valid but which draw an irrelevant conclusion, such as the fallacy of treating as cause what is not
cause (SR5, 29).14
At the outset of Sophistical Refutations Aristotle identifies a pervasive source of error that serves as a theme
throughout the treatise. He attributes most mistakes in reasoning to a person's inexperience with the formal matters
of argumentation, with the semantic matters of language, and with having insufficient information. He writes:
Both sullogismos and elenchos are sometimes genuine and sometimes not, though inexperience may
make them appear so-for inexperienced people obtain only, as it were, a distant view of these things.
For a sullogismos rests on certain statements such that they involve necessarily the assertion of
something other than what has been stated, through what has been stated; an elenchos is a
sullogismos to the contradictory of the given conclusion. Now some of them do not really achieve this,
though they seem to do so for a number of reasons; and of these the most prolific and usual is the
argument that turns upon names. It is impossible in a discussion to bring in the actual things discussed:
we use their names as symbols instead of them; and we suppose that what follows in the names,
follows in the things as well-For names are finite and so is the sum-total of accounts, while things are
infinite in number. Inevitably, then, the same account and a single name signify several things. In the
same way in arguments too those who are not well acquainted with the force of names misreason both
in their own discussions and when they listen to others. (SR1: 164b25-165a17; cf. SR33)15
Aristotle alerts his readers, both those who intend to engage publicly in disputation and those wishing privately to
improve their own reasoning, to two matters. On the one hand, there are the formal matters of argumentation and,
on the other hand, there is the matter of the content, the 'what' that is treated in an argumentation. Aristotle asks for
precision in both matters. In this connection, we cite at length Aristotle's synopsis at SR7 on the causes of error in
respect of each genus of fallacy, namely, the six that depend upon the language used and the seven independent of
the language used. Both sources of error indicate his attention to semantic matters in relation to an underlying logical
syntax.
The error comes about in the case of arguments that depend on equivocation and [ambiguity]
because we are unable to distinguish the various senses (for some terms it is not easy to distinguish,
e.g. one, being, and sameness), while in those that depend on combination and division, it is because
we suppose that it makes no difference whether the phrase is combined or divided, as is indeed the
case with most phrases. Likewise also with those that depend on accent-With those that depend on
the form it is because of the likeness of expression. For it is hard to distinguish what kind of things are
signified by the same and what by different kinds of expression (for a man who can do this is
practically next door to the understanding of the truth, and knows best how to assent) because we
suppose every predicate of anything to be an individual thing, and we understand it as being one thing;
for it is to that which is one and to substances that individuality and being seem especially to belong.-
With those fallacies that depend on accident, error comes about because we cannot distinguish what is
the same and what is different, what is one and what many, or what kinds of predicate have all the
same accidents as their subject. Likewise also with those that depend on the consequent; for the
consequent is a branch of accident. Moreover, in many cases it seems and it is claimed that if this is
inseparable from that, so also is that from this. With those that depend upon deficiency in the account
of a refutation, and with those that depend upon the difference between a qualified and an
unqualified statement, error consists in the smallness of the difference involved; for we treat the
limitation to the particular thing or respect or manner or time as adding nothing to the meaning, and so
grant a statement universally. Likewise also in the case of those that assume the original point, and
those of false cause, and all that treat a number of questions as one; for in all of them the error lies in
the smallness of the difference; for our failure to be quite precise in our definition of propositions and of
sullogismoi is due to the aforesaid reason. (169a22-169b17; emphases added)
 
Lack of precision, relative to a particular person in respect of an inability to distinguish various senses of words and
expressions or a failure to distinguish what is the same and what is different, points to a person's inexperience with
linguistic usage and meaning and with scientific and philosophical understanding, and, we may add, with ignorance of
what a sullogismos is. Aristotle in Sophistical Refutations also draws attention to a person's inexperience not only
with public disputation, for example, by not having secured a statement that has a single meaning, but only one that
appears to have (see, e.g. SR10 on not distinguishing the word from the thought or the thing signified), but also with
other semantic and formal matters of argumentation, for example, not recognizing that the conclusion may follow not
in fact but only verbally (SR8). In this latter respect also consider his reducing all thirteen fallacies to ignoratio
elenchi or ignorance of what a sullogismos is. Moreover, a passage at SR6 reminds of us of what Aristotle writes in
De Interpretatione and Prior Analytics on propositions. He writes:
Those fallacies that depend upon the making of several questions into one consist in our failure to
articulate the account of a proposition. For a proposition predicates a single thing of a single thing. For
the same definition applies to one single thing only and to the thing without qualification, e.g. to man and
to one single man only; and likewise also in other cases. If, then, a single proposition is one which
claims a single thing of a single thing, a proposition, without qualification, will be the putting of a
question of that kind. Now since a sullogismos starts from propositions and a refutation is a
sullogismos, a refutation, too, will start from propositions. (169a6-14)
Surely, knowledge of 'formal' logic is crucial for reasoning well, whether in constructing an argumentation or in
defending oneself from refutation. In particular, attention must be directed to how terms of different semantic
categories determine different underlying logical forms.
Below we show that Aristotle's use of 'sullogismos' in Sophistical Refutations denotes an argument that fits a
panvalid argument pattern as treated in Prior Analytics and that 'phainomenos sullogismos' denotes an argument
that appears to fit such a pattern. However, such an argument really fits another pattern, for example, one with four
terms as in a case of equivocation, which is not a sullogismos at all. A sophistical refutation or phainomenos
sullogismos, as we treat it below, is an argument that appears to be a sullogismos but is really an invalid argument.
As Aristotle remarks, such arguments need solution, whether a refutation or a proof of their invalidity.
 
5.1 Equivocation and ambiguity. Aristotle recognizes three varieties of equivocation and ambiguity: "[1] when
either the account or the name properly signifies more than one thing ... [2] when by custom we use them so,-[3]
when words that have a simple sense taken alone have more than one meaning in combination" (SR4). At SR17 he
addresses solving erroneous reasoning when fighting eristic persons by treating them not as refuting, but as merely
appearing to refute. He writes at 175a36-175b3 (emphases added):
For if refutation is a non-equivocal contradiction arrived at from certain premises, there will be no
need to draw distinctions against ambiguity and equivocation; for they do not effect a sullogismos.
The only motive for drawing further distinctions is that the conclusion reached looks like a refutation.
What, then, we have to beware of, is not being refuted, but seeming to be, because of course the
asking of ambiguities and of questions that turn upon equivocation, and all the other tricks of that kind,
both conceal a genuine refutation and make it uncertain who is refuted and who is not.
His comments here are complemented by what he says at SR17 that if people never made two questions into one
question, the fallacies relating to equivocation and ambiguity would never arise, rather there would either be genuine
refutation or none at all. He continues:
Accordingly wherever it is uncertain in which of two senses the premiss proposed is usually meant-
whether as maxims are (for people call both true opinions and general assertions maxims), or like 'the
diagonal of a square is incommensurate with its side'; and moreover whenever opinions are divided as
to the truth, we then have subjects of which it is very easy to change the terminology undetected. For
because of the uncertainty in which of the two senses the premiss contains the truth, one will not be
thought to be playing any trick, while because of the division of opinion, one will not be thought to be
telling a falsehood; for the change will make the position irrefutable. (176b17-25)
Aristotle recognizes that a case of equivocation amounts to an argument appearing to be an instance of a given
sullogismos, that is, of a given panvalid argument pattern. However, the argument is really an instance of another
pattern, usually one having four terms and not three, and not valid. This condition is disguised by a linguistic
phenomenon not immediately recognized by a participant who takes the argument to be a sullogismos. Thus, while
the grammatical pattern makes the argument seem to conform to one of the sullogismoi, its underlying logical
pattern is different.
We take the following example of equivocation from SR4 to illustrate Aristotle's thinking and to show that
underlying his thinking are the formal considerations reached in Prior Analytics A4-7.
Or again, "Evils are good, for what must exist is good, and evil must exist". Here "must exist" is used in
two senses; it means "what is necessary", which is often true of evils (for some evil is necessary), and
we also say that good things "must [ought to] exist". (165b34-38)
This argument may be expressed more formally by using Aristotle's 'syllogistic' methods as follows (schematic letters
as above, premises numbered, conclusion indicated by '?').
Argument: phainomenos-sullogismos Argmnt:
abbrev term
constants
Sentence
patterns
Apprnt
argmnt
pattern
Apprt
truth 
value
1. Good [G] belongs to every that which must exist [M].
2. That which must exist belongs to some evil [E].
? Good belongs to some evil.
1. GaM
2. MiE
? GiE
1. PaS
2. PiS
? PiS
1. PaM
2. MiS
? PiS
T
T
F
This argument appears to fit the pattern Barbara, and thus it appears also that the conclusion follows necessarily
from the premises. The absurdity is that, while the premises are thought to be true, the conclusion is thought to be
false but nevertheless to follow logically. Taking Aristotle's comments on the equivocal use of 'must exist', we can
recast the argument to make explicit its underlying logical pattern as follows, and thus we can recognize it to be an
instance of a phainomenos sullogismos or a non-sullogismos, that is, an invalid argument ('X' and 'Z' are also used
as schematic letters).
Argument: non-sullogismos Argmnt:
abbrev
term
constants
Sentence
patterns
Argmnt
pattern
Truth
value
1. Good [G] belongs to every that which ought to exist
[O].
2. That which is necessary [N] belongs to some evil [E].
? Good belongs to some evil.
1. GaO
2. NiE
? GiE
1. PaS
2. PiS
? PiS
1. PaX
2. ZiS
? PiS
T
F
F
Here we see that there is no middle but a fourth term. Aristotle provides three other instances of equivocation at
SR4. Two of them follow.
'The same man is both seated and standing and he is both sick and in health; for it is he who stood up who is
standing, and he who was recovering who is in health; but it is the seated man who stood up, and the sick
man who was recovering.' For 'The sick man does so and so', or 'has so and so done to him' is not single in
meaning: sometimes it means the man who is sick now, sometimes the man who was sick formerly. Of
course, the man who was recovering was the sick man, who really was sick at the time; but the man who is in
health is not sick at the same time: he is the sick man in the sense not that he is sick now, but that he was sick
formerly.
Argument: phainomenos-sullogismos Argmnt:
abbrev
term
constants
Sentence
patterns
Apparnt
argmnt
pattern
Apprttruth
value
1. Standing [T] belongs to every person who stood up
[W].
2. Person who stood up belongs to every seated man
[M].
? Standing belongs to every seated man.
1. TaW
2. WaM
1. PaS
2. PaS
1. PaM
2. MaS
T
T
? TaM ? PaS ? PaS F
 
Argument: non-sullogismos Argmnt:
abbrev
term
constants
Sentence
patterns
Argmnt
pattern
Truth
value
1. Standing [T] belongs to every person who stood up [W].
2. Person who stood up belongs to every seated man [M].
? Standing belongs to every formerly seated man [F].
1. TaW
2. WaM
? TaF
1. PaS
2. PaS
? PaS
1. PaM
2. MaX
? PaZ
T
T
T
 
Argument: phainomenos-sullogismos Argmnt:
abbrev
term
constants
Sentence
patterns
Apprnt
argmnt
pattern
Apprt
truth
value
1. Being in health [H] belongs to every was recovering [R].
2. Was recovering belongs to every sick man [K].
? Being in health belongs to every sick man.
1. HaR
2. RaK
? HaK
1. PaS
2. PaS
? PaS
1. PaM
2. MaS
? PaS
T
T
F
 
Argument: non-sullogismos Argmnt:
abbrev
term
constants
Sentence
patterns
Argmnt
pattern
Truth
value
1. Being in health belongs to every was recovering.
2. Was recovering belongs to every sick man while ailing.
? Being in health belongs to every formerly sick man [F].
1. HaR
2. RaK
? HaF
1. PaS
2. PaS
? PaS
1. PaM
2. MaX
? PaZ
T
T
T
 In these two cases the third or minor term is used equivocally to make the subject term of the conclusion a fourth
term. At SR22, in addressing fallacies of identical form of expression, Aristotle notes that the same thing happens in
these cases as happens in cases of equivocation: "for in dealing with equivocations the tyro in argument supposes
that the fact and not the name which he affirmed has been denied". Aristotle cites the following argument with its
solution.
'Does a man tread upon what he walks through?-But he walks through a whole day'. But the words denote not what
he walks through, but when he walks.
Argument: phainomenos-sullogismos Argmnt:
abbrev
term
constants
Sentence
patterns
Apprnt
argmnt
pattern
Apprt
truth
value
1. A man's treading upon [T] belongs to every a man's
walking through [W].
2. A man's walking through belongs to every whole day [D].
? A man's treading upon belongs to every whole day.
 1. TaW
2. WaD
? TaD
1. PaS
2. PaS
? PaS
1. PaM
2. MaS
? PaS
T
T
F
 
Argument: non-sullogismos Argmnt:
abbrev term
constants
Sentence
patterns
Argmnt
pattern
Truth
value
1. A man's treading upon [T] belongs to every a man's
spatially walking through [W].
2. A man's [temporally] walking through [R] belongs to every
whole day [D].
? A man's treading upon belongs to every whole day.
 1. TaW
2. RaD
 
? TaD
1. PaS
2. PaS
 
? PaS
1. PaX
2. ZaS
 
? PaS
T
T
 
F
 
Here the 'would-be' middle term is used equivocally. This argument could be remedied by addressing the
equivocation in the following way, which eliminates both the appearance of a sullogismos and a case of an invalid
argument by producing a sullogismos. Consider the following:
Argument: a sullogismos but not a refutation Argmnt:
abbrev
term
constants
Sentence
patterns
Argmnt
pattern
Truth
value
1. A man's [spatially] treading upon [T] belongs to no a
man's[temporally] walking through [W].
2. A man's[temporally] walking through belongs to
every whole day [D].
? A man's [spatially] treading upon belongs to no whole
day.
1. TeW
2. WaD
 
? TeD
1. PeS
2. PaS
 
? PeS
1. PeM
2. MaS
 
? PeS
T
T
 
T
 
We can now see that the above arguments really fit other logical patterns, in most cases one with four terms, and
thus these arguments are not sullogismoi at all. In such cases Aristotle recognizes that a given word or expression
may have two different meanings and thus fall into two different semantic domains/categories, or denote two
different terms. Thus, while an argument with an equivocal expression has a given grammatical pattern that makes it
appear to be a sullogismos, it really has an underlying logical pattern different than a sullogismos.
It is similar with ambiguity: while a given argument with an ambiguity has one grammatical pattern, which helps to
make it appear to be a sullogismos, it really has two underlying logical patterns. At SR4 Aristotle cites five cases of
ambiguity, two of which are arguments: First: 'There must be sight of what one sees; one sees the pillar; ergo the
pillar has sight'.
Argument: phainomenos-sullogismos Argmnt:
abbrev term
constants
Sentence
patterns
Apprnt
argmnt
pattern
Apprt
truth
value
1. Sight [S] belongs to every what is seen [W].
2. What is seen belongs to some pillar [P].
? Sight belongs to some pillar.
1. SaW
2. WiP
? SiP
1. PaS
2. PiS
? PiS
1. PaM
2. MiS
? PiS
T
T
F
 
Argument: non-sullogismos Argmnt:
abbrev term
constants
Sentence
patterns
Argmnt
pattern
Truth
value
1. Being seen [B] belongs to every what is seen [W].
2. What is seen belongs to some pillar [P].
? Having capacity to see [S] belongs to some pillar
1. BaW
2. WiP
1. PaS
2. PiS
1. XaM
2. MiS
T
T
? SiP ? PiS ? ZiS F
 
This argument might also be addressed in the following way, in which case we produce a sullogismos.
Argument: an instance of a sullogismos Argmnt:
abbrev term
constants
Sentence
patterns
Argmnt
pattern
Truth
value
1. Being seen [B] belongs to every what is seen [W].
2. What is seen belongs to some pillar [P].
? Being seen [B] belongs to some pillar
1. BaW
2. WiP
? BiP
1. PaS
2. PiS
? PiS
1. PaM
2. MiS
? PiS
T
T
T
 
The second argument-"What you profess to be, that you profess to be; you profess a stone to be; ergo you profess
to be a stone."-is more difficult to formalize strictly and at the same time preserve the effect. Still, however, consider
the following:
Argument: phainomenos-sullogismos Argmnt:
abbrev
term
constants
Sentence
patterns
Apprntargmnt
pattern
Apprttruth
value
1. Your professing that to be [B] belongs to every
your professing something to be [E].
2. Your professing something to be belongs to
some stone [S].
? Your professing that to be belongs to some
stone.
1. BaE
2. EiS
? BiS
1. PaS
2. PiS
? PiS
1. PaM
2. MiS
? PiS
T
T
F
 
Argument: non-sullogismos Argmnt:
abbrev
term
constants
Sentence
patterns
Agmnt
pattern
Truthvalue
1. Your professing that to be [B] belongs to every your 1. BaE 1. PaS 1. XaM T
professing something to exist [E].
2. Your professing something to exist belongs to some
stone [S].
? Your professing to be that [T] belongs to some stone.
2. EiS
? TiS
2. PiS
? PiS
2. MiS
? ZiS
T
F
 
The other meaning of this argument expresses a sullogismos as follows.
Argument: a sullogismos Argmnt:
abbrev
term
constants
Sentence
patterns
Agmnt
pattern
Truthvalue
1. Your professing that to exist [B] belongs to every your
professing something to exist [E].
2. Your professing something to exist belongs to some
stone [S].
? Your professing that to exist [T] belongs to some stone.
1. BaE
2. EiS
? BiS
1. PaS
2. PiS
? PiS
1. PaM
2. MiS
? PiS
T
T
T
 
5.2 Combination and division. Aristotle at SR4 treats the fact that the meanings of words in combination and in
division differ; but there he does not provide examples of faulty arguments. At SR20 he takes up solving refutations
that depend on division or combination. The following is one of his argument examples (177a36-177b12).
'Was he being beaten with that with which you saw him being beaten?' and 'Did you see him being beaten with that
with which he was being beaten?' This has also in it an element of ambiguity in the questions, but it really depends
upon combination. -It is evident also that not all refutations depend upon ambiguity as some people say they do. The
answerer, then, must divide the expression; for to see a man being beaten with my eyes is not the same as to say I
saw a man being beaten with my eyes.
Formalizing this argument 'syllogistically' we have the following:
Argument: phainomenos-sullogismos Argmnt:
abbrev
term
constants
Sentence
patterns
Apprnt
argmnt
pattern
Apprnt
truth
value
1. Being beaten with that with which I saw him being beaten  1. BaS  1. PaS 1. PaM  T
[B] belongs to every that with which I saw him being beaten
[S].
2. That with which I saw him being beaten belongs to every
my eyes [E].
? Being beaten with that with which I saw him being beaten
belongs to every my eyes.
2. SaE
 
? BaE
2. PaS
 
? PaS
2. MaS
 
? PaS
T
 
F
 
Argument: non-sullogismos Argmnt:
abbrev term
constants
Sentence
patterns
Argmnt
pattern
Truth
value
1. Being beaten with that with which I saw him being beaten
[B] belongs to every that with which I saw him being beaten
[S].
2. That with which I saw him being beaten belongs to every
my eyes [E].
? Being beaten with the thing which I saw him being beaten [T]
belongs to every my eyes.
 1. BaS
 
2. SaE
 
? TaE
1. PaS
2. PaS
 
? PaS
1. XaM
2. MaS
 
? ZaS
T
T
 
F
 
5.3 Without qualification or not without qualification. Aristotle treats the fallacy of using an expression without
qualification or not without qualification but with some qualification of respect, or place, or time, or relation. Of the
four examples there we cite the following.
'What is, is not, if it is not a particular kind of being, e.g. if it is not a man.' For it is not the same thing not to be
something and not to be without qualification: it looks as if it were, because of the closeness of the expression, i.e.
because to be something is but little different from to be, and not to be something from not to be.
Argument: phainomenos-sullogismos Argmnt:
abbrev term
constants
Sentence
patterns
Apprnt
argmnt
pattern
Appnt
truth
value
1. Not to be something [N] belongs to every man [M].
2. Man belongs to some what is[W].
? Not to be something belongs to some what is.
1. NaM
2. MiW
? NiW
1. PaS
2. PiS
? PiS
1. PaM
2. MiS
? PiS
T
T
F
 Argument: non-sullogismos Argmnt:
abbrev
term
constants
Sentence
patterns
Argmnt
pattern
Truth
value
1. Not to be something (unqualified) [N]belongs to every man
[M].
2. Man belongs to some what is [W].
? Not to be something else in particular (qualified) [E] belongs to
some what is.
1. NaM
2. MiW
? EiW
1. PaS
2. PiS
? PiS
1. XaM
2. MiS
? ZiS
F
T
T
 
Now the absurdity is resolved because the underlying logical pattern has been made evident. At SR25 Aristotle
provides other examples relating to solving those fallacies without qualification or not without qualification. Consider
the following two.
'Is health, or wealth, a good thing?-But to the fool who does not use it a LEFT it is not a good thing; therefore it is
both good and not good'.
Argument: phainomenos-sullogismos Argmnt:
abbrev term
constants
Sentence
patterns
Apprntargmnt
pattern
Apprt
truth
value
1. Good [G]] belongs to every wealth [W].
2. Wealth belongs to some bad thing [B].
? Good belongs to some bad thing.
1. GaW
2. WiB
? GiB
1. PaS
2. PiS
? PiS
1. PaM
2. MiS
? PiS
T
T
F
 
Argument: non-sullogismos Argmnt:
abbrev
term
constants
Sentence
patterns
Argmnt
pattern
Truth
value
1. Good [G]] belongs to every wealth (unqualified)
[W].
2. Wealth (qualified) [F] belongs to some bad thing [B].
? Good belongs to some bad thing.
1. GaW
2. FiB
1. PaS
2. PiS
1. PaX
2. ZiS
T
T
? GiB ? PiS ? PiS F
 
'Is that which the prudent man would not wish, an evil?-But he would not wish to lose the good; therefore the good
is an evil'. But it is not the same thing to say that the good is an evil and to lose the good is an evil. Similarly with the
argument of the thief: for it is not the case that if the thief is an evil thing, acquiring things is also evil; what he wishes,
therefore, is not what is evil but what is good; for to acquire is good.
Argument: phainomenos-sullogismos Argmnt:
abbrev
term
constants
Sentence
patterns
Apprnt
argmnt
pattern
Apprttruth
value
1. Evil [E] belongs to every what the thief wishes [T].
2. What the thief wishes belongs to every acquiring
things [A].
? Evil belongs to every acquiring things.
1. EaT
2. TaA
? EaA
1. PaS
2. PaS
? PaS
1. PaM
2. MaS
? PaS
T
T
F
 
Argument: non-sullogismos Argmnt:
abbrev
term
constants
Sentence
patterns
Argmnt
pattern
Truth
value
1. Evil [E] belongs to every what the thief wishes
(unqualified, viz. stealing) [T].
2. What the thief wishes (qualified) [Q] belongs to every
acquiring things [A].
? Evil belongs to every acquiring things.
1. EaT
2. QaA
? EaA
1. PaS
2. PaS
? PaS
1. PaX
2. ZaS
 
? PaS
T
F
 
F
 
Aristotle remarks in general on the causes of this fallacy at SR5. An occurrence of this fallacy depends upon whether
an expression is used without qualification or in a certain respect and not strictly, that is, when an expression is used
in a particular sense but is taken without qualification.
 
5.3 Consequent. At SR5 Aristotle explicitly attributes the causes of the refutation which depends upon the
consequent to a person's supposing that the relation of consequence is convertible: "For whatever, if this is the case,
that necessarily is the case, they then suppose also that if the latter is the case, the former necessarily is the case".
Mentioning that this also happens in syllogistic reasoning, he cites Melissus' argument at SR5 (interestingly, Aristotle
remarks on this argument at three places: SR5, 6, and 28).
Melissus' argument that the universe is infinite, assumes that the universe has not come to be (for from what is not
nothing could possibly come to be) and that what has come to be has done so from a first beginning. If, therefore,
the universe has not come to be, it has no first beginning, and is therefore infinite. But this does not necessarily
follow; for if what has come to be always has a first beginning, it does not follow that what has a first beginning has
come to be; any more than it follows that if a man in a fever is hot, a man who is hot must be in a fever. (167b13-
20)
We may rewrite this argumentation formally as a deduction as follows.
Argument: phainomenos-sullogismos Argmnt:
abbrev
term
constants
Explanation Truth
value
1.No beginning [N] belongs to every ungenerated
[U].
2.Infinite [I] belongs to every ungenerated.
3.No beginning belongs to every universe [W].
? Infinite belongs to every universe.
4.Ungenerated belongs to every no beginning.
5.No beginning belongs to every universe.
6.Ungenerated belongs to every universe
7.Infinite belongs to every ungenerated.
8.Ungenerated belongs to every universe.
9.Infinite belongs to every universe.
1. NaU.
2. IaU.
3. NaW.
? IaW.
4. UaN.
5. NaW.
6. UaW.
7. IaU.
8. UaW.
9. IaW.
1. Premise
2. Premise
3. Premise
? Conclusion
4. 1 a-conversion
5. 3 repetition
6. 4,5 Barbara
7. 2 repetition
8. 6 repetition
9. 7,8 Barbara
T
T
T
 
T
T
T
T
T
T
 
Here we can see that the fault of this apparent deduction is to convert at step 4an a-sentence, which does not admit
of simple (but of per accidens) conversion. We can compare the mistake here and Aristotle's example of the 'man
with a fever' to his instruction at Prior Analytics A2 where he treats conversion.
 
6. Concluding remarks. We have reviewed Aristotle's metalogical accomplishments at Prior Analytics A4-7 and
seen that he consciously worked with 'syllogistic' argument patterns and that he recognized these patterns to be
abstract or formal objects, that is, to be relatively uninterpreted objects. In this respect, then, we can appreciate
Aristotle to distinguish a given argument's underlying logical syntax both from its subject matter and its semantics.
While it is doubtful that Aristotle held a modern theory of language, it is nevertheless evident that he recognized
different argument patterns to underlie sentences in arguments involving, for example, ambiguity and equivocation.
In just this connection, we can appreciate his logical acumen in recognizing that linguistic expressions (words and
phrases) have different meanings; accordingly, the same expression might fall into different semantic domains and
thus represent different terms. As we have seen, using Aristotle's 'artificial' categorical syllogistic syntax, ambiguous
or equivocal terms disguise different logical relations. Repeatedly Aristotle alerts his readers to the necessity for
drawing distinctions. It is this recognition, we believe, that prompted his referring to the faulty reasonings treated in
Sophistical Refutations as phainomenoi sullogismoi, that is, as arguments that appear to fit given sullogismoi-
given panvalid elemental argument patterns-but which in truth have different underlying logical syntaxes. Indeed, the
lessons in Sophistical Refutations that we have reviewed are the more intelligible if one understands Aristotle to
have worked with a clear notion of an argument's pattern into which fit, for example, ambiguous expressions that
give the appearance of correct reasoning. He may even, we suggest, have presupposed in Sophistical Refutations
the metalogical findings of his logical investigations in Prior Analytics, notwithstanding the generally accepted order
of his having written these treatises. We may recall what Aristotle says at SR11, that "he is a dialectician who
examines by the help of a theory of sullogismos [deduction]", to indicate his attention to the formal matters of
reasoning, which are properly treated as subject matter for the science of logic.
 
Notes
1. Aristotle defines sullogismos at: Prior Analytics 24b18-20, Topics 100a25-27, Sophistical Refutations
164b27-165a2, and Rhetoric 1356b16-18. This statement is from Prior Analytics. We transliterate 'sullogismos'
rather than translate by "deduction" or even "syllogism" to help objectify its meaning; cf. J. Gasser 1991.
2. J. N. Keynes, for example, typical of the traditionalist interpretation, cites six of the syllogism (1906: 287-291; cf.
R. M. Eaton 1959: 95-100). It is interesting to note that, while traditionalists are concerned with correct reasoning in
their treatment of syllogisms, they do not understand Aristotle to work with a natural deduction system and they
entirely miss Aristotle's concern with the epistemic process of deduction.
3. Corcoran's terminology, with its refined determinations, is especially useful for making sense of Aristotle's logical
investigations. Moreover, beyond their applicability to studies of Aristotle's logic, they are an important contribution
toward improving the intelligibility of discourse on logic and refining matters of logic.
4. This is evident from the nature of his logical investigations themselves and from how Aristotle understands the
relationship of the two Analytics. Cf. Aristotle's discussion on the relatively topic neutral character of the common
notions related to treating quantities at Metaphysics 1061b20-21. Consider also in Prior Analytics A1 where he
remarks that demonstrative and dialectical argumentation equally syllogize (sullogizesthai) and in Sophistical
Refutations that didactic, dialectical, examination, and contentious arguments also equally syllogize. Especially see
Sophistical Refutations 9 where he states that the dialectician is not concerned with a particular subject matter of
argumentation but with what is common to every art and faculty (170a35-36).
5. With deductionists, then, we take Aristotle to have genuine proof-theoretic interests. On Aristotle's having proof-
theoretic interests, see R. Smith 1984: 594-596, 1986: 55-61, and 1991: 48-50. J. Corcoran (1974, 1994) and R.
Smith (1989) have generally made Aristotle's case in this respect.
6. J. Corcoran (1974: 100) has called these "metalinguistic variables"; cf. R. Smith (1984: 590, 595) who refers to
them as "syntactic variables for terms". We believe that Aristotle takes his letters to be schematic letters in a way
similar to W. Quine's meaning (1970:12; 1982: 33, 145-146, 160-162, 289, 300-301).
7. Note that Aristotle specifically converts the derived sentence patterns in Camestres and Disamis to preserve this
syntax.
8. We use, with some modifications, R. Smith's translation of Prior Analytics (1989) to cite Aristotle's text in
translation.
9. The traditional names of the sullogismoi are: First figure-Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio; second figure-Cesare,
Camestres, Festino, Baroco; third figure-Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison.
10. Modern logicians refer to the validity of an argument. Thus, a given sentence follows logically from other given
sentences if it is implied by the other sentences, or if it is a logical consequence of the other sentences, or if all the
information in the given sentence is contained in the other sentences, or if there exists no counterargument. An
argument is invalid if one or none of the validity conditions holds.
11. While the distinction between "pattern" and "form" may not make a difference to Aristotle studies, it is very
important for clearing up some confusion about establishing invalidity. We follow John Corcoran (1993: xxxi-xxxvii)
in distinguishing form from pattern as follows. While a given sentence has only one logical form, it may fit a number
of patterns. An argument, likewise, has only one form but may fit a number of patterns. The difference "pattern" and
"form" is important especially for determining a given argument to be invalid by the method of counterargument.
Every argument, for example, whatever its number of premises, fits the argument pattern 'premise-set-conclusion'
(schematically 'P-c'), but obviously not every argument has the same logical form. While two arguments in the same
logical form are either both valid or both invalid, some arguments in a given pattern may be valid while others are
invalid. See also above section 3.1.
12. The method of contrasted instances works for almost all premise-pair patterns, noticeably failing in some
instances when the minor premise is a particular, and usually a privative, sentence.
13. Take, for example, the sentence expressing the Barbara and Celarent rules at A4, 25b32-35 (cf. 25b37-39
[Darii], 25b40-26a2 [Ferio]). 'Barbara' is used both to denote the rule and to name the argument pattern.
14. We also do not consider fallacies based upon accent (SR4, 21), accident (SR5, 24), ignoratio elenchi (SR5, 6,
26), assuming the point (SR5, 27) and making several questions into one (SR5, 30) for similar reasons.
15. We use, with some modifications, W. A. Pickard-Cambridge's translation of Sophistical Refutations (1928) to
cite Aristotle's text.
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